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Arena Model: Inference About Competitions
Chenhe Zhang1 and Peiyuan Sun2
Abstract. The authors propose a parametric model called the arena model for prediction
in paired competitions, i.e. paired comparisons with eliminations and bifurcations. The
arena model has a number of appealing advantages. First, it predicts the results of com-
petitions without rating many individuals. Second, it takes full advantage of the structure
of competitions. Third, the model provides an easy method to quantify the uncertainty
in competitions. Fourth, some of our methods can be directly generalized for comparisons
among three or more individuals. Furthermore, the authors identify an invariant Bayes es-
timator with regard to the prior distribution and prove the consistency of the estimations of
uncertainty. Currently, the arena model is not effective in tracking the change of strengths
of individuals, but its basic framework provides a solid foundation for future study of such
cases.
AMS 2010 subject classification: 60K37, 62F07, 62F15.
Keywords: paired comparisons, competitions, arena model without fluctuations, Bayesian
inference, arena model with fluctuations, the coefficient of fluctuations.
1 Introduction
The research on paired comparisons has a long history. In 1927, Thurstone [30] studied
a psychological continuum and compared two physical stimulus magnitudes. Two decades
later, Bradley and Terry [5] proposed a model for rating players and Elo [8] developed a
system with a heuristic algorithm to update ranks of the players. In the past half century,
many statistical studies have been devoted to paired comparisons from various perspec-
tives, including but not limited to, ties in paired comparison experiments [10, 25], dynamic
Bradley-Terry models concerning changeable merits [7, 9, 11, 12], algorithms for ranking
[3, 15, 26], and applications in sports [13, 20].
Although current models have been tremendously successful in many real-world appli-
cations such as sports and chess, they do have a number of limitations. First, it is rather
complicated and inefficient to rate all individuals if there are too many of them. Second,
elimination games only permit players who beat their opponents to advance to the next
round and few current models take advantage of this. Third, few models provide a quanti-
tative description to “how much the outcome of a match is influenced by skill, or by chance”,
as questioned in [18]. Fourth, to the best knowledge of the authors, no models based on
paired comparisons are directly applicable to comparisons among three or more objects.
The above observations motivate questions as follows.
(Q-1) Can we predict results of comparisons without any rating system?
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(Q-2) How to exploit eliminations to forecast the performance of individuals?
(Q-3) How to quantify the uncertainty in comparisons?
(Q-4) How to directly predict results of comparisons where p individuals win out from q
individuals, without using paired comparisons?
In this paper, we answer all the above questions. Following most classic models, we
assume that the results of a competition depend on two families of factors: that of un-
derlying individuals attributes called strengths and that of interaction functions. Different
from most current models, we focus on prediction without any rating system and introduce
competitions as special comparisons reminiscent of eliminations and evolutions. Moreover,
we start from the structure generated by competitions and propose an original probability
model called arena. We first define the simplest family of arenas to introduce the concept
and derive its basic properties, which are our answers to (Q-1) and (Q-2). Then a specific
arena is generalized in the most straightforward way to fit reality. We propose an important
metric of uncertainty in competitions with its consistent estimators to answer (Q-3). Actu-
ally, the arena permits comparisons among more than two individuals. The corresponding
conclusions and methods can be easily generalized from paired competitions, which answers
(Q-4). As Aldous stated in [2], “there has been surprisingly little “applied probability” style
mathematical treatment of the basic model.” Hence, with some reasonable assumptions, we
focus on mathematical derivations more than data analysis and simulations to pave the way
for the future study.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss a probability
problem which is helpful to understand the concept of arenas and define arenas without
fluctuations. A Bayes estimator of an individual’s future results is given in Section 3, which
is invariant in a sense. This is followed in Section 4 by an improvement of former arenas.
An important parameter called the coefficient of fluctuations is proposed with consistent
estimators. In Section 5, we further improve arenas and illustrate the attendant influence
as well as a new consistent estimator. Finally, the arena model is evaluated by data analysis
and simulations. We also compare our model to classic ones on paired comparisons in Section
6. See Appendix A for the proof of a theorem in Section 5.
2 What are arenas
To better understand the concept of arenas, we first discuss a probability problem. Consider
N=2m+n players are playing a game. The rules of the game are as follows.
(R1) At the beginning, every player is assigned a random number X as his strength.
It does not change during this game. Assume X is a continuous random variable and its
probability density p(·) is supported on Θ. Besides, each player’s win/loss record is denoted
by a dualistic array (·, ·) called his state. The states of all players are (0, 0) at the beginning.
(R2) In the first round, every player is randomly assigned an opponent. The player
with higher strength wins this round, and his state turns into (1,0); the player with lower
strength loses this round, and his state turns into (0,1).
(R3) Given i < m and j < n, a player whose state is (i, j) will be randomly arranged
an opponent whose state is also (i, j) in his next round. The player with higher strength
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wins this round, and his state turns into (i+ 1, j); the player with lower strength loses this
round, and his state turns into (i, j + 1).
(R4) A state (i, j) is called a boundary state if i = m or j = n. After a player reaches
a boundary state, the corresponding state is called his result of this game and this game is
over for him.
(a) Figure 1: Elimination form (b) Figure 2: Bifurcation form
Figure 1 and Figure 2 describe the transformation of players’ states and can help us
understand the matchmaking process. We call a game that satisfies these four rules an m-n
arena game. Since X is a continuous random variable, the probability that two players’
strengths are identical is zero. So we think without loss of generality that no ties happen
in an arena game. First of all, we give the following theorem, which tells us the probability
for a player to obtain different results.
Theorem 2.1. For the above game, the possible results of a player are
(m, 0), (m, 1), · · · , (m,n − 1), (m− 1, n), (m − 2, n), · · · , (0, n).
Let Ai,j denote the event that the player has reached the state (i, j), then we have
P(Am,j) =
(
m+ j − 1
m− 1
)
(
1
2
)m+j , j = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1,
P(Ai,n) =
(
n+ i− 1
n− 1
)
(
1
2
)n+i, i = 0, 1, · · · ,m− 1.
(2.1)
Proof. For all players in state (i, j), where i < m and j < n, half of their states will turn
into (i+ 1, j) and half (i, j + 1). Therefore, we have
P(Ai,j) =
(
i+ j
i
)(1
2
)i+j
, 0 6 i 6 m− 1, 0 6 j 6 n− 1. (2.2)
Since there is only one source for each boundary state, we find
P(Am,j) = 1
2
P(Am−1,j) =
(
m+ j − 1
m− 1
)(1
2
)m+j
, j = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1, (2.3)
P(Ai,n) = 1
2
P(Ai,n−1) =
(
n+ i− 1
n− 1
)(1
2
)n+i
, i = 0, 1, · · · ,m− 1. (2.4)
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The probability here has nothing to do with his strength and we have little information
of this player. We now consider strengths. It is evident that a player in state (i, j + 1) is
likely to have higher strength compared with a player in state (i, j). The following theorem
presents the probability distribution of the strength of a player in different states.
Theorem 2.2. Let Xi,j denote the strength of a player who has reached state (i, j) in a
run. Then Xi,j is a continuous random variable and

p0,0(x) = p(x),
pi,0(x) = 2pi−1,0(x)
∫ x
−∞
pi−1,0(t)dt, (1 6 i 6 m− 1)
p0,j(x) = 2p0,j−1(x)
∫ +∞
x
p0,j−1(t)dt, (1 6 j 6 n− 1)
pi,j(x) =
2i
i+ j
pi−1,j(x)
∫ x
−∞
pi−1,j(t)dt+
2j
i+ j
pi,j−1(x)
∫ +∞
x
pi,j−1(t)dt,
(1 6 i 6 m− 1, 1 6 j 6 n− 1)
pm,j(x) = 2pm−1,j(x)
∫ x
−∞
pm−1,j(t)dt, (0 6 j 6 n− 1)
pi,n(x) = 2pi,n−1(x)
∫ +∞
x
pi,n−1(t)dt, (0 6 i 6 m− 1)
(2.5)
where pi,j(·) is the probability density of Xi,j .
Proof. Let X denote the strength of a player and Ai,j have the same meaning as we stated
before, then we have X0,0
d
= X ∼ p(x) and
P(x < Xi,j 6 x+∆x) = P(x < X 6 x+∆x|Ai,j). (2.6)
(Case a) 1 6 i 6 m − 1, j = 0 or 1 6 j 6 n − 1, i = 0. Assume Xi,0 is a continuous
random variable and its probability density function is pi,0(·). For ∆x > 0, according to the
Theorem 2.1, (R3) and (2.6), we have
P(x < Xi+1,0 6 x+∆x) =
P(Ai+1,0|x < X 6 x+∆x)P(x < X 6 x+∆x)
P(Ai+1,0)
=
P(Ai+1,0,Ai,0|x < X 6 x+∆x)P(x < X 6 x+∆x)
P(Ai+1,0)
=
P(Ai+1,0|Ai,0, x < X 6 x+∆x)P(x < X 6 x+∆x|Ai,0)P(Ai,0)
P(Ai+1,0)
= 2P(x < Xi,0 6 x+∆x)P(X
(1)
i,0 < X|Ai,0, x < X 6 x+∆x),
where X
(1)
i,0 represents the strength of this player’s opponent in the (i+ 1)-th round, whose
former state is also (i, 0). Notice that
P(X
(1)
i,0 < x|Ai,0, x < X 6 x+∆x) 6 P(X(1)i,0 < X|Ai,0, x < X 6 x+∆x)
6 P(X
(1)
i,0 < x+∆x|Ai,0, x < X 6 x+∆x).
(2.7)
According to (R3), X
(1)
i,0 and X are independent given Ai,0, then we have
P(x < Xi+1,0 6 x+∆x) = 2P(x < Xi,0 6 x+∆x)
(
P(X
(1)
i,0 < x)+O(∆x)
)
(∆x→ 0). (2.8)
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Therefore, by induction we findXi,0 is a continuous random variable and its density function
satisfies
pi,0(x) = 2pi−1,0(x)
∫ x
−∞
pi−1,0(t)dt, i = 1, 2, · · · ,m− 1. (2.9)
Similarly, we have
p0,j(x) = 2p0,j−1(x)
∫ +∞
x
p0,j−1(t)dt, j = 1, 2, · · · , n− 1. (2.10)
(Case b) 1 6 i 6 m− 1 and 1 6 j 6 n− 1. For this case, notice that
P(x < X 6 x+∆x|Ai,j) =P(Ai,j,Ai−1,j |x < X 6 x+∆x)P(x < X 6 x+∆x)
P(Ai,j)
+
P(Ai,j,Ai,j−1|x < X 6 x+∆x)P(x < X 6 x+∆x)
P(Ai,j)
Then the rest of the proof is analogous to the (Case a).
(Case c) i = m, 0 6 j 6 n − 1 or j = n, 0 6 i 6 m− 1. For players in boundary states
(m, j) and (i, n), there is only one source: winners from state (m − 1, j) and losers from
state (i, n − 1) respectively. The rest is similar to the first case.
Deriving distribution functions from density functions gives the following corollary.
Corollary 2.3. Let Fi,j(x) denote the distribution function the strength of a player who has
reached state (i, j) in an arena game. Then we have

F0,0(x) =
∫ x
−∞
p(t)dt,
Fi,0(x) =
(
Fi−1,0(x)
)2
, (0 6 i 6 m− 1)
F0,j(x) = 1−
(
1− F0,j−1(x)
)2
, (0 6 j 6 n− 1)
Fi,j(x) =
i
i+ j
(
Fi−1,j(x)
)2
+
j
i+ j
(
1− (1− Fi,j−1(x))2),
(1 6 i 6 m− 1, 1 6 j 6 n− 1)
Fm,j(x) =
(
Fm−1,j(x)
)2
, (0 6 j 6 n− 1)
Fi,n(x) = 1−
(
1− Fi−1,n(x)
)2
. (0 6 i 6 m− 1)
(2.11)
In fact, we can derive the distribution of a player’s strength in different states from
order statistics. According to (R2), the first round of a run can be viewed as simple random
sampling from the original distribution. The states of players with higher strengths turn
into (1,0) while the ones of players with lower strengths turn into (0,1). Therefore, we have
X1,0
d
= max{X(1)0,0 ,X(2)0,0}, X0,1
d
= min{X(1)0,0 ,X(2)0,0} (2.12)
respectively, where X
(1)
0,0 ,X
(2)
0,0 i.i.d ∼ p0,0(·). Similarly, we have
Xi,0
d
= max{X(1)i−1,0,X(2)i−1,0}, X0,j
d
= min{X(1)0,j−1,X(2)0,j−1}, (2.13)
where
X
(1)
i−1,0,X
(2)
i−1,0 i.i.d ∼ pi−1,0(·) , X(1)0,j−1,X(2)0,j−1 i.i.d ∼ p0,j−1(·). (2.14)
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For players in state (i, j)(1 6 i 6 m− 1, 1 6 j 6 n− 1), the population includes two groups
of players that winners from state (i−1, j) and losers from state (i, j−1), whose ratio can be
uniquely determined by Theorem 2.1. Through this, some results can be easily generalized
for competitions among three or more individuals. We do not discuss such case in this paper
and leave it for some further research.
Theorem 2.1 tells us how many people are there in different states. However, what
interests us is the probability for a player, whose strength is already known as x, to obtain
different results. The following theorem answers this.
Theorem 2.4. In an m-n arena game, suppose X is the random number assigned to a
player with the probability density p0,0(·) and x is a real number in the Θ. Let Ai,j and
pi,j(·) have the same meaning as the above, then
P(Am,j|X = x) = P(Am,j) · pm,j(x)
p0,0(x)
, j = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1,
P(Ai,n|X = x) = P(Ai,n) · pi,n(x)
p0,0(x)
, i = 0, 1, · · · ,m− 1.
(2.15)
Proof. The definition of Ai,j, Theorem 2.1 and 2.2 yield
P(Am,j|X = x) = lim
∆x→0
P(Am,j, x < X 6 x+∆x)
P(x < X 6 x+∆x)
= lim
∆x→0
P(x < Xm,j 6 x+∆x)P(Am,j)
p0,0(x)∆x
= P(Am,j) · pm,j(x)
p0,0(x)
, j = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1.
(2.16)
By the same token, we have
P(Ai,n|X = x) = P(Ai,n) · pi,n(x)
p0,0(x)
, i = 0, 1, · · · ,m− 1. (2.17)
Further, we can define a random variable to indicate the probabilities for a player to
obtain different results in an m-n arena game, given his strength.
Definition 2.1. Suppose m,n ∈ N, λ ∈ (0, 1) and a two-dimensional vector ξ takes values
on {
(m, j) : j = 0, 1, · · · , n − 1} ∪ {(i, n) : i = 0, 1, · · · ,m− 1},
and its probability mass function is given by
P
(
ξ = (m, j)
)
=
(1
2
)m+j(m+ j − 1
m− 1
)
pm,j(λ)
p0,0(λ)
, j = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1, (2.18)
P
(
ξ = (i, n)
)
=
(1
2
)n+i(n+ i− 1
n− 1
)
pi,n(λ)
p0,0(λ)
, i = 0, 1, · · · ,m− 1, (2.19)
where the pi,j(·) follows Theorem 2.2. Then we call ξ an arena random variable with param-
eter λ, m, n and p(·), which are called strength, win threshold, loss threshold and original
density respectively. Simply denote it as ξ ∼ Arena(λ;m,n, p).
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It should be emphasized that P
(
ξ = (m, j)
)
and P
(
ξ = (i, n)
)
represent the probabilities
that a player with strength λ obtains different results, while pm,j and pi,n the probabilities
without any information.
3 Arena model without fluctuations
We have got a complete solution to this probability problem, which includes the percentage
of players with different results, probability distributions of strengths of players in different
states, and the probability for a player to obtain different results with a fixed strength. These
results will serve as the basis of the following inferences. Actually, a player’s strength always
changes little in a relatively short time. As a result, we can give a Bayesian inference on the
strength and results of a player, under the assumption that every player has a constant as
his strength. We now establish the arena without fluctuations and do that in this Section.
3.1 Assumptions
In this part, four assumptions are given, according to which an m-n arena without fluctua-
tions with original density p(·) can be established.
(A1) In an arena, an infinite number of runs can be held among a fixed group of indi-
viduals. These individuals are called players. All players constitute a countably infinite set
Aq0,0 = {a1, a2, · · · }, where al is the l-th player and q = 1, 2, · · · .
(A2) Each player has an observable state (i, j) ∈ ε with respect of time and an unob-
servable constant strength x ∈ R, where
ε = {(i, j) : 0 6 i 6 m, 0 6 j 6 n}\{(m,n)}.
Denote the strength of the l-th player by Xl. Assume X1,X2, · · · Xn, · · · are independent
and identically distributed, supported on Θ, and their density function is p(x).
(A3) Let Aqi,j denote the set of players whose states are (i, j) after (i + j)-th round in
the q-th run. If
0 6 i 6 m− 1, 0 6 j 6 n− 1,
then the system will randomly assign him an opponent al′ from A
q
i,j. If Xl > Xl′ , then let
al ∈ Aqi+1,j , al′ ∈ Aqi,j+1.
Otherwise, let
al ∈ Aqi,j+1, al′ ∈ Aqi+1,j.
(A4) If a player’s state satisfies i = m or j = n in the q-th run, then we say the player’s
q-th run is over and the (i, j) is called his result of the q-th run. When all players’ q-th runs
are over, a new run will start according to (A3). At the same time, their numbers of runs
q plus one.
In a word, an m-n arena without fluctuations consists of infinitely many m-n arena
games, where players’ constant strengths will not be affected by their previous results.
As we stated about arena games before, no ties happen in an arena without fluctuations as
well, due to Assumption (A2). In (A3), we mentioned that the assignment is random. What
should a random assignment be? We all know that assignments in a round are idempotent;
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that is, if player A’s opponent is player B, then player B’s opponent must be player A.
Besides, the term random here is not the one in the strict sense since a uniform random
variable cannot be supported on a countably infinite set. Hence, we define the matching
system here.
Definition 3.1. σ : A→ A is called a matching map on a nonempty set A if
∀a ∈ A, σ(a) 6= a, σ(σ(a)) = a.
Definition 3.2. σ : Ω × AM → AM is called a random matching on a finite set AM
(|AM | =M is even) in the probability space (Ω,F ,P), if ∀ω ∈ Ω, σ(ω, ·) is a matching map
on AM and
∀a ∈ AM ,∀a′ ∈ AM\{a},P
(
σ(a) = a′
)
=
1
M − 1 . (3.1)
In other words, a random matching can be viewed as a stochastic process in the prob-
ability space (Ω,F ,P). Both the index set and state space are AM . Now we regard the
random matching on a countably infinite set A as a pro forma limit of the one on finite set
AM , which means P
(
σ(a) = a′
)
could be infinitely small. Hence, the random matching on
a countably infinite set A is supposed to satisfy P(σ(a) = a′) = 0 though strictly speaking
σ is no longer a stochastic process.
Definition 3.3. Assume A is a countably infinite set and σ is called a random matching
on A in the probability space (Ω,F ,P) if
∀a, a′ ∈ A,P(σ(a) = a′) = 0 and P(σ(σ(a)) = a) = 1. (3.2)
We have assumed that every player has an unobservable constant as his strength. Ac-
cording to Assumption (A1), (A3), (A4) and Definition 3.3, the opponents of a player in
all rounds are different with probability one, and their strengths are merely related to the
state of the player. A Markov chain emerges if we consider the transition of the states of a
player. Before proving it, we define a specific Markov chain.
Definition 3.4. Let S = (St, t > 1) be a Markov chain whose state space is
ε =
{
(i, j) : 0 6 i 6 m, 0 6 j 6 n
}\{(m,n)},
where m,n are positive integers and its probability transfer function satisfies:
if i = m or j = n, then
P
(
Sk+1 = (0, 0)|Sk = (i, j)
)
= 1, (3.3)
if 0 6 i 6 m− 1 or 0 6 j 6 n− 1, then
P
(
Sk+1 = (i+ 1, j)|Sk = (i, j)
)
= Fi,j(λ),
P
(
Sk+1 = (i, j + 1)|Sk = (i, j)
)
= 1− Fi,j(λ),
(3.4)
where Fi,j(·) follows (3.2). Then we call S an m-n arena process without fluctuations with
parameter λ and original distribution F (·), where m,n are called win threshold and loss
threshold respectively. Simply write
S ∼ A(λ;m,n, F ).
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3.2 Bayesian inference on results in arenas without fluctuations
One of our goals is to infer a player’s future performance from his past performance. Its
significance is supported by many practical examples, such as sports game like FIFA World
Cup and population competitions in Biology. In this part, we only consider the constant
strengths of players and exclude unstable factors, although “chance” does contribute the
performance of players. The improve work of that will be done in the next Section.
Theorem 3.1. In an m-n arena without fluctuations with original density p(·), a player’s
states are recorded by
S = {St = (it, jt), t > 1}.
Suppose X is the strength of this player, λ ∈ Θ, and F (x) = ∫ x
−∞
p(t)dt, then we have
S|X = λ ∼ A(λ;m,n, F ).
Proof. Let Fi,j(x) have the same meaning in Corollary 2.3. For given (i1, j1), (i2, j2), · · · , (ik, jk)
satisfying {
it = jt = 0, it−1 = m or jt−1 = n,
it − it−1 = 1 or jt − jt−1 = 1, otherwise,
(3.5)
if ik = m or jk = n, then according to Assumption (A4),
P
(
Sk+1 = (0, 0)|Sk = (ik, jk),X = λ
)
= P
(
Sk+1 = (0, 0)|Sk = (ik, jk), · · · , S1 = (i1, j1),X = λ
)
= 1.
If 0 6 ik 6 m−1 or 0 6 jk 6 n−1, define T = {0 6 t 6 k−1 : 0 6 it 6 m−1, 0 6 jt 6 n−1}.
For t ∈ T ∪ {k}, let
σqtit,jt : Ω×A
qt
it,jt
→ Aqtit,jt,
be a random matching on Aqtit,jt. According to Assumptions (A1), (A3) and Definition 3.3,
P
(
∀t ∈ T, σqtit,jt 6= σ
qk
ik,jk
∣∣∣Sk = (ik, jk), · · · , S1 = (i1, j1),X = λ) = 1. (3.6)
Assumption (A2) and (3.6) yield
P
(
Sk+1 = (ik + 1, jk)|Sk = (ik, jk), · · · , S1 = (i1, j1),X = λ
)
=P
(
X > Xσqkik,jk
∣∣∣∣Sk = (ik, jk), · · · , S1 = (i1, j1),X = λ
)
=P
(
X > Xσqkik,jk
,∀t ∈ T, σqtit,jt 6= σ
qk
ik,jk
∣∣∣∣Sk = (ik, jk), · · · , S1 = (i1, j1),X = λ
)
=P
(
Xσqkik,jk
< λ
)
.
Corollary 2.3 gives the distributions of strengths of players in different states in an m-n
arena game. According to Assumption (A1) and (A4), the distributions of the strengths of
players in an m-n arena is the same as that result. It follows that
P
(
Sk+1 = (ik + 1, jk)|Sk = (ik, jk), · · · , S1 = (i1, j1),X = λ
)
=P
(
Sk+1 = (ik + 1, jk)|Sk = (ik, jk),X = λ
)
= Fik ,jk(λ),
(3.7)
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where Fi,j follows (). Similarly,
P
(
St+1 = (it, jt + 1)|Sk = (it, jt), · · · , S1 = (i1, j1),X = λ
)
=P
(
St+1 = (it, jt + 1)|St = (it, jt),X = λ
)
= 1− Fit,jt(λ).
(3.8)
In conclusion, by Definition 3.4 we have
S|X = λ ∼ A(λ;m,n, F ).
In Assumption (A1), the original density characterizes the strengths of all players. Hence,
the original density is an appropriate choice of our prior distribution. Furthermore, by
choosing the original density as the prior distribution, we can derive an invariant estimator
which is independent of it. We first give the posterior distribution of a player’s strength.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose a player plays k rounds in an m-n arena without fluctuations with
original density p(·) and his states turn successively into
x˜ =
(
(i1, j1), (i2, j2), · · · , (ik, jk)
)
.
Choose p(·) to be the prior distribution of his strength X, then the posterior distribution of
X is
π(λ|x˜) =
∏
t∈I1
[
(it − it−1)Fit−1,jt−1(λ) + (jt − jt−1)
(
1− Fit−1,jt−1(λ)
)]
p(λ)
∫
Θ
∏
t∈I1
[
(it − it−1)Fit−1,jt−1(λ) + (jt − jt−1)
(
1− Fit−1,jt−1(λ)
)]
p(λ)dλ
, (3.9)
where Fi,j follows (3.2) and I1 = {1 6 t 6 k : it > it−1 or jt > jt−1}.
Proof. Suppose St is the state of this player after his (t− 1)-th round and S = (St, t > 1).
Based on Theorem 3.1, we have
S|X = λ ∼ A(λ;m,n, F ).
As a result, the posterior distribution of X is
π(λ|x˜) = p(x˜|λ)π(λ)∫
Θ p(x˜|λ)π(λ)dλ
=
k∏
t=1
P (St = (it, jt)|St−1 = (it−1, jt−1),X = λ)p(λ)
∫
Θ
k∏
t=1
P (St = (it, jt)|St−1 = (it−1, jt−1),X = λ) p(λ)dλ
=
∏
t∈I1
[
(it − it−1)Fit−1,jt−1(λ) + (jt − jt−1)
(
1− Fit−1,jt−1(λ)
)]
p(λ)
∫
Θ
∏
t∈I1
[
(it − it−1)Fit−1,jt−1(λ) + (jt − jt−1)
(
1− Fit−1,jt−1(λ)
)]
p(λ)dλ
.
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The word round here is different from the one in our assumptions. On the one hand,
the round in our assumptions is a finite value in a run. The round here represents a value
that can be arbitrarily large and does not return to zero even though a run ends. On the
other hand, state (0,0) is deliberately inserted before the start of a run.
The next theorem shows a significant property of an arena without fluctuations. The
posterior predictive distribution usually relies on the prior distribution chosen by us. Never-
theless, the posterior distribution of a player’s future results in an arena without fluctuations
is irrelevant to the prior distribution of player’s strength p(·).
Theorem 3.3. Choose p(·) in Assumption (A1) to be the prior distribution of a player’s
strength X. Given k successive states of a player
x˜ = (x1, x2, · · · , xk) =
(
(i1, j1), (i2, j2), · · · , (ik, jk)
)
,
then the next r states of this player (xk+1, xk+2, · · · , xk+r) has a posterior predictive distri-
bution irrelevant to p(·).
Proof. Denote the states sequence of this player by S = (St, t > 1). Theorem 3.1 gives
S|X = λ ∼ A(λ;m,n, F ).
Therefore, we have
P(St+1 = (ik+1, jk+1), · · · , Sk+r = (ik+r, jk+r)|x˜)
=
∫
Θ
P(Sk+1 = (ik+1, jk+1), · · · , Sk+r = (ik+r, jk+r)|x˜,X = λ)π(λ|x˜)dλ
=
∫
Θ
k+r−1∏
t=k
P(St+1 = (it+1, jt+1)|St = (it, jt),X = λ)π(λ|x˜)dλ,
(3.10)
Notice that if it = m or jt = n,
P
(
St+1 = (it+1, jt+1)|St = (it, jt)
)
=
{
1, it+1 = jt+1 = 0,
0, otherwise.
(3.11)
If 0 6 it 6 m− 1 and 0 6 jt 6 n− 1,
P
(
St+1 = (it+1, jt+1)|St = (it, jt)
)
=


Fit,jt(λ), it+1 = it + 1 and jt+1 = jt,
1− Fit,jt(λ), it+1 = it and jt+1 = jt + 1,
0, otherwise.
(3.12)
According to Corollary 2.3, it is easy to prove by induction that function Fi,j(·) can be
expressed in the form
Fi,j(λ) = gi,j
(
F (λ)
)
, (0 6 i 6 m, 0 6 j 6 n) (3.13)
where gi,j(·) is a polynomial function. Substituting (3.9), (3.11), (3.12), and (3.13) into
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(3.10) yields
P (St+1 = (ik+1, jk+1), · · · , Sk+r = (ik+r, jk+r)|x˜)
=
∫
Θ
∏
t∈I2
{
(it − it−1)git−1,jt−1
(
F (λ)
)
+ (jt − jt−1)
[
1− git−1,jt−1
(
F (λ)
)]}
p(λ)dλ
∫
Θ
∏
t∈I1
{
(it − it−1)git−1,jt−1
(
F (λ)
)
+ (jt − jt−1)
[
1− git−1,jt−1
(
F (λ)
)]}
p(λ)dλ
=
∫ 1
0
∏
t∈I2
[
(it − it−1)git−1,jt−1(u) + (jt − jt−1)
(
1− git−1,jt−1(u)
)]
du
∫ 1
0
∏
t∈I1
[
(it − it−1)git−1,jt−1(u) + (jt − jt−1)
(
1− git−1,jt−1(u)
)]
du
,
where
I1 = {1 6 t 6 k : it > it−1 or jt > jt−1},
I2 = {1 6 t 6 k + r : it > it−1 or jt > jt−1}.
Since git,jt(·) is irrelevant to u = F (λ), pr(xk+1, · · · , xk+r|x˜) can be computed by the integral
of polynomials, which completes the proof.
4 Arena model with fluctuations in the infinite case
The previous arena strictly follows the jungle law—one who has higher strength wins the
game. Nevertheless, accidents may happen in the real world. For example, it is possible that
a green hand wins a veteran due to his good luck. Hence, an improved model considering
fluctuations should be established. Four assumptions are set here to establish an m-n arena
with fluctuations:
(A1) In an arena, an infinite number of runs can be held among a fixed group of indi-
viduals, and these individuals are called players. All players constitute a countably infinite
set Aq0,0 = {a1, a2, · · · }, where al is the l-th player and q = 1, 2, · · · .
(A2’) For each player, there is an observable (i, j) ∈ ε as his state with respect of time
and an unobservable constant x ∈ R as his strength, where
ε = {(i, j) : 0 6 i 6 m, 0 6 j 6 n}\{(m,n)}.
Denote the strength of the l-th player as Xl. Assume X1,X2, · · · Xn, · · · are independent
and identically distributed, and their density function is p(x). Call
Xq,kl = Xl +
ρl√
2
ǫq,kl (4.1)
the performance of the l-th player in the k-th round of his q-th run, where ρl > 0 is an
unknown value called the coefficient of fluctuations of the l-th player and ǫq,kl is the relative
fluctuations of the l-th player in the k-th round of the q-th run. Assume
ǫ1,1l , ǫ
1,2
l , · · · , ǫ2,1l , ǫ2,2l , · · · , ǫ3,1l , ǫ3,2l , · · · i.i.d ∼ N(0, 1)
and Xl, ǫ
q,k
l , ǫ
q′,k′
l′ are mutually independent for arbitrary q, q
′, k, k′ and l 6= l′.
(A3’) Let Aqi,j denote the set of players whose states are (i, j) after (i + j)-th round in
the q-th run. If
0 6 i 6 m− 1, 0 6 j 6 n− 1,
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then the system will randomly assign an opponent al′ from A
q
i,j to him. If X
q,i+j+1
l >
Xq,i+j+1l′ , then let
al ∈ Aqi+1,j , al′ ∈ Aqi,j+1.
Otherwise, let
al ∈ Aqi,j+1, al′ ∈ Aqi+1,j.
(A4’) If a player’s state satisfies i = m or j = n in the q-th run, then we say the player’s
q-th run is over and this state (i, j) is called his result of the q-th run. When all players’
q-th runs are over, a new run will start according to (A3’). At the same time, their numbers
of runs q plus one.
We also think there are no ties due to Assumption (A2’). Specifically, an arena with
fluctuations is called an arena with uniform fluctuations if
∀l ∈ N, ρl = ρ > 0. (4.2)
In this case, ρ is called the coefficient of fluctuations. This coefficient depicts the variance
of fluctuations and reflects the “fairness” of a competition. Here “fairness” refers to a great
probability that a player with high strength wins the one with low strength; in other words,
every player deserves for his results according to his strength. It is easy to understand this
concept by comparing two games that chess and finger-guessing. For simplicity, only 1-1
arena with uniform fluctuations is studied in this paper, where a player’s result of a run is
either win (his result is (1,0) and simply write 1) or loss (his result is (0,1) and simply write
0).
In a 1-1 arena, a player is likely to meet any other players because they all compete in
the same state (0,0). In this part, we discuss the estimation of the coefficient of fluctuations
based on our four basic assumptions. We call this part infinite case because the population
of players is a countably infinite set according to Assumption (A1). In this case, we can
express the result of the l-th player in his k-th round in the form
Ilk = 1
{
Xl +
ρ√
2
ǫl,k > Xσk(l) +
ρ√
2
ǫσk(l),k
}
, (4.3)
where σk is a random matching on A
q
0,0 and ǫl,k is the relative fluctuations of the l-th
player in his k-th round. We can see that the l-th player wins his k-th round iff Ilk = 1.
The following theorem gives the conditional distribution of Ilk in a 1-1 arena with uniform
fluctuations.
Theorem 4.1. For arbitrary l ∈ N and λ ∈ R,
Il1|Xl = λ, Il2|Xl = λ, · · · , Iln|Xl = λ i.i.d ∼ Bernoulli
(
Φ
( λ√
1 + ρ2
))
,
where Xl is the strength of the l-th player and Ilk = 1{The l-th player wins his k-th round}.
Proof. By Assumption (A2’) we straightforwardly have
P(Ilk = 1|Xl = λ) = P
(
Xl +
ρ√
2
ǫl,k > Xσk(l) +
ρ√
2
ǫσk(l),k
∣∣∣∣Xl = λ
)
= P
(
Xσk(l) +
ρ√
2
ǫσk(l),k −
ρ√
2
ǫl,k < λ
∣∣∣∣Xl = λ
)
.
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On the ground of Definition 3.3,
Xl,Xσk(l), ǫσk(l),k, ǫl,k i.i.d ∼ N(0, 1),
and therefore,
P(Ilk = 1|Xl = λ) = P(Xσk(l) +
ρ√
2
ǫσk(l),k −
ρ√
2
ǫl,k < λ) = Φ
( λ√
1 + ρ2
)
. (4.4)
Moreover,
Xσ1(l), ǫσ1(l),1, ǫl,1,Xσ2(l), ǫσ2(l),2, ǫl,2, · · · ,Xσn(l), ǫσn(l),n, ǫl,n i.i.d ∼ N(0, 1).
Combining it with (4.4) gives
Il1|Xl = λ, Il2|X = λ, · · · , Iln|X = λ i.i.d ∼ Bernoulli
(
Φ
( λ√
1 + ρ2
))
.
With the results of m players in their n rounds, we can write a matrix
I =


I11 I12 · · · I1n
I21 I22 · · · I2n
...
...
. . .
...
Im1 Im2 · · · Imn

 ,
where Ilk = 1{The l-th player wins his k-th round}. According to Theorem 4.1, we have
E
(1
n
n∑
k=1
Ilk
)
= EΦ
( Xl√
1 + ρ2
)
, (4.5)
E
( 1
n
n∑
k=1
Ilk
)2
=
1
n
EΦ
( Xl√
1 + ρ2
)
+
(
1− 1
n
)
EΦ2
( Xl√
1 + ρ2
)
, (4.6)
where Xl ∼ N(0, 1). To approach an estimation of ρ, we first calculate the mean value and
the second moment of Φ( Xl√
1+ρ2
).
Definition 4.1. Suppose X ∼ N(0, 1) and Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of
standard normal distribution. Then we call ξ = Φ( X√
1+ρ2
) a win rate random variable with
parameter ρ > 0, and simply write ξ ∼Wr(ρ).
Proposition 4.2. Suppose ξ ∼Wr(ρ),Φ(·) and p(·) are the cumulative distribution function
and probability density function of the standard normal distribution respectively. Then,
(1) the mean value of ξ
Eξ =
1
2
, (4.7)
(2) the second moment of ξ
Eξ2 =
1
2
− 1
π
arctan
√
1 + ρ2
3 + ρ2
. (4.8)
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Proof. (1) An immediate computation shows that
Eξ =
∫ +∞
−∞
p(x)Φ
( x√
1 + ρ2
)
dx
=
∫ +∞
0
p(x)
(
Φ
( x√
1 + ρ2
)
+Φ
( −x√
1 + ρ2
))
dx
=
∫ +∞
0
p(x)dx =
1
2
.
(4.9)
(2) Define
f(a) =
∫ +∞
−∞
p(x)Φ2
(x
a
)
dx
= a
∫ +∞
−∞
p(ax)Φ2(x)dx =
∫ +∞
−∞
Φ2(x)dΦ(ax)
= 1− 2
∫ +∞
−∞
p(x)Φ(x)Φ(ax)dx.
(4.10)
Since g(a, x) = p(x)Φ(x)Φ(ax) > 0 is continuously differentiable on [0,+∞)× R and∫ +∞
−∞
g(a, x)dx 6
∫ +∞
−∞
p(x)dx = 1 <∞, (4.11)
∫ +∞
−∞
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂ag(a, x)
∣∣∣∣ dx 6 1π(1 + a2)
∫ +∞
0
e−tdt =
1
π(1 + a2)
<∞, (4.12)
the integral
∫ +∞
0
∂
∂ag(a, x)dx is uniformly convergent for a ∈ [0,+∞). Hence,
d
da
∫ +∞
−∞
p(x)Φ(x)Φ(ax)dx =
∫ +∞
−∞
∂
∂a
g(a, x)dx
= − 1
2π(1 + a2)
∫ +∞
−∞
Φ(x)de−
1+a2
2
x2
=
1
2π(1 + a2)
1√
2π
∫ +∞
−∞
e−
2+a2
2
x2dx
=
1
2π
1
(1 + a2)
√
2 + a2
.
(4.13)
Also, ∫ +∞
−∞
p(x)Φ(x)Φ(0)dx =
1
2
∫ +∞
−∞
Φ(x)dΦ(x) =
1
4
. (4.14)
By (4.10), (4.13) and (4.14), we have
f(a) =
1
2
− 1
π
∫ a
0
1
(1 + u2)
√
2 + u2
du
=
1
2
− 1
π
∫ arctan a√
2
0
√
2sec2θdθ√
2(1 + 2tan2θ)secθ
=
1
2
− 1
π
∫ arctan a√
2
0
dsinθ
1 + sin2θ
=
1
2
− 1
π
arctan
a√
2 + a2
.
(4.15)
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Therefore,
Eξ2 =
∫ +∞
−∞
p(x)Φ2
( x√
1 + ρ2
)
dx = f(
√
1 + ρ2) =
1
2
− 1
π
arctan
√
1 + ρ2
3 + ρ2
. (4.16)
With the help of the second moment of a win rate random variable, we can directly find
a moment estimation of the coefficient of fluctuations.
Theorem 4.3. Assume in a 1-1 arena with uniform fluctuations, m players are sampled
randomly and their results Ilk = 1{The l-th player wins his k-th round} form an m × n
sample matrix
I =


I11 I12 · · · I1n
I21 I22 · · · I2n
...
...
. . .
...
Im1 Im2 · · · Imn

 .
Then, the estimator
ρˆ =
√
3− tan2πT
tan2πT − 1 (4.17)
is a strongly consistent estimation of the coefficient of fluctuations ρ, where
T =
1
n− 1
(
1
mn
m∑
l=1
Y 2l −
1
2
)
, Yl =
n∑
k=1
Ilk, l = 1, 2, · · · ,m. (4.18)
Proof. First, we prove Il1k1 and Il2k2 are independent for any l1 6= l2. By Assumption (A3’)
and Definition 3.3, we have
Xl1 , ǫl1,k1 ,Xσk1 (l1), ǫσk1 (l1),k1 ,Xl2 , ǫl2,k2 ,Xσk2 (l2), ǫσk2 (l2),k2
are mutually independent. Also,
Il1k1 = 1{Xl1 +
ρ√
2
ǫl1,k1 > Xσk1 (l1) +
ρ√
2
ǫσk1 (l1),k1},
Il2k2 = 1{Xl2 +
ρ√
2
ǫl2,k2 > Xσk2 (l2) +
ρ√
2
ǫσk2 (l2),k2},
we have Il1k1 , Il2k2(l1 6= l2) are independent. Therefore,
(I11, I12, · · · , I1n), (I21, I22, · · · , I2n), · · · , (Im1, Im2, · · · , Imn)
are mutually independent. Let Yl =
n∑
k=1
Ilk(l = 1, 2, · · · ,m), then Y1, Y2, · · · , Ym are inde-
pendent. According to Theorem 4.1, we have
Yl|Xl = λ ∼ B
(
n,Φ
( λ√
1 + ρ2
))
.
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Applying Proposition 4.2 yields
E(Y 2l ) = nEΦ
( Xl√
1 + ρ2
)
+ (n2 − n)EΦ2( Xl√
1 + ρ2
)
=
n2
2
− n
2 − n
π
arctan
√
1 + ρ2
3 + ρ2
.
(4.19)
Since Y1, Y2, · · · , Ym are mutually independent and identically distributed, applying strong
law of large numbers gives
Y 21 + Y
2
2 + · · ·+ Y 2m
m
−→ n
2
2
− n
2 − n
π
arctan
√
1 + ρ2
3 + ρ2
(m→∞) a.s. (4.20)
ρˆ =
√
3− tan2πT
tan2πT − 1 −→ ρ (m→∞) a.s. (4.21)
In conclusion, ρˆ is a strongly consistent estimator of ρ.
5 Arena model with fluctuations in the finite case
Part of the Assumption (A1) is impractical since the population of players is a countably infi-
nite set since the number of players in a game is always finite. So we update the Assumption
(A1) into
(A1’) In an arena, an infinite number of runs can be held among a fixed group of
individuals, and these individuals are called players. All players constitute a finite set
Aq0,0 = {a1, a2, · · · , aM}, where al is the l-th player, M is even and q = 1, 2, · · · .
A question is naturally posed that does the above estimator still perform well under the
new assumption? The answer is not straightforward for two reasons. First, the normality
assumption in Assumption (A2’) is almost meaningless and the statement
Il1|Xl = λ, Il2|Xl = λ, · · · , Iln|Xl = λ i.i.d ∼ Bernoulli
(
Φ
( λ√
1 + ρ2
))
no longer holds because in this case, the strengths of a player’s opponents are some constants
instead of a continuous random variable. Now we reconsider the value of P(I11 = I12 =
1|X1 = λ) when the total number of players is an even number M <∞. Let us compute it
with an extreme example. Suppose only two players A and B participate in a 1-1 arena and
ρ is zero. The strength of player A’s opponent will be a constant during n rounds although
it normally distributes in the first round. Therefore,
Φ(λ) = P(I11 = I12 = 1|X1 = λ) = P(X2 < X1|X1 = λ)
6= P(I11 = 1|X1 = λ)P(I12 = 1|X2 = λ) =
(
Φ(λ)
)2
.
In addition, the total number of every player’s wins
Yl =
n∑
k=1
Ilk, l = 1, 2, · · · ,m,
17
are not independent obviously and there is an identity that
M∑
l=1
Yl =
Mn
2
. (5.1)
Thanks to our definition of random matching on a countably infinite set, we guess
naturally from Theorem 4.1 that
lim
M→∞
P(I11 = 1, I12 = 1|X1 = λ) = lim
M→∞
[
P(I11 = 1|X1 = λ)P(I12 = 1|X1 = λ)
]
. (5.2)
In other words,
P(I11 = 1, I12 = 1|X1 = λ) = P(I11 = 1|X1 = λ)P(I12 = 1|X1 = λ) + o(1), as M →∞.
(5.3)
In order to prove an estimator similar to (4.17) is consistent, EY 2l and V ar(
∑M
l=1 Y
2
l ) with
respect to M are required. Taking M into consideration, we assume I
(M)
lk and Y
(M)
l =∑n
k=1 I
(M)
lk to be the result of the l-th player in his k-th round and the total number of
wins of the l-th player repectively when the population of the players is a finite set AM =
{a1, a2, · · · , aM} and Ilk and Yl =
∑n
k=1 Ilk the ones as we notate in Section 5.
Lemma 5.1. As defined before,
Y
(M)
l
d−→ Yl, as M →∞.
Proof. For a given even number M and 1 6 l 6 M , construct an event
A =
n−1⋃
i=1
n⋃
j=i+1
{σi(l) = σj(l)}. (5.4)
It is easy to see that A does not happen iff no player competes with the l-th player more
than once in n rounds. On one hand, since A and Xl are independent, for arbitrary λ ∈ R
we have
P
(
I
(M)
l1 = 1, I
(M)
l2 = 1, · · · , I(M)ln = 1
∣∣∣Xl = λ)
>P
(
I
(M)
l1 = 1, I
(M)
l2 = 1, · · · , I(M)ln = 1, A¯
∣∣∣Xl = λ)
=P
(
I
(M)
l1 = 1, I
(M)
l2 = 1, · · · , I(M)ln = 1
∣∣∣A¯,Xl = λ)P (A¯) .
(5.5)
By Assumption (A3’) and Definition 3.2, σi(l) and σj(l) are independent and
P
(
σi(l) = l
′
)
=
1
M − 1 , ∀l
′ ∈ AM\{al}.
Therefore,
P(A) 6
n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
P
(
σi(l) = σj(l)
)
=
n(n− 1)
2
1
M − 1 . (5.6)
Provided that M is large enough,
P(A¯) = 1− P(A) > 1− n(n− 1)
2
1
M − 1 > 0. (5.7)
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According to Assumption (A2’), we have
P
(
I
(M)
l1 = 1, I
(M)
l2 = 1, · · · , I(M)ln = 1
∣∣∣A¯,Xl = λ)
=P
(
Xσ1(l) +
ρ√
2
ǫσ1(l),1 −
ρ√
2
ǫl,1 < λ, · · · ,Xσn(l) +
ρ√
2
ǫσn(l),n −
ρ√
2
ǫl,n < λ
∣∣∣∣A¯,Xl = λ
)
,
(5.8)
and in the condition that ∀i 6= j, σi(l) 6= σj(l), Xl,Xσi(l) andXσj(l) are mutually independent.
As a result,
Xσ1(l) +
ρ√
2
ǫσ1(l),1 −
ρ√
2
ǫl,1, · · · ,Xσn(l) +
ρ√
2
ǫσn(l),n −
ρ√
2
ǫl,n i.i.d ∼ N(0,
√
1 + ρ2),
which are independent of Xl, given A¯. Combining it with (4.3), (5.5), (5.7) and (5.8) yields
P
(
I
(M)
l1 = 1, I
(M)
l2 = 1, · · · , I
(M)
ln = 1
∣∣∣Xl = λ) > (1− n(n− 1)
2
1
M − 1
)[
Φ
( λ√
1 + ρ2
)]n
.
(5.9)
On the other hand,
P
(
I
(M)
l1 = 1, I
(M)
l2 = 1, · · · , I
(M)
ln = 1
∣∣∣Xl = λ)
6P
(
I
(M)
l1 = 1, I
(M)
l2 = 1, · · · , I
(M)
ln = 1
∣∣∣A¯,Xl = λ)P(A¯) + P(A)
6
[
Φ
( λ√
1 + ρ2
)]n
+
n(n− 1)
2
1
M − 1 .
(5.10)
Applying the Squeezing Theorem to (5.9) and (5.10) yields
lim
M→∞
P
(
I
(M)
l1 = 1, I
(M)
l2 = 1, · · · , I(M)ln = 1
∣∣∣Xl = λ)
=P (Il1 = 1, Il2 = 1, · · · , Iln = 1|Xl = λ) =
[
Φ
( λ√
1 + ρ2
)]n
.
(5.11)
If Il1, Il2, · · · , Iln take other values, it suffices to flip the inequality sign in (5.8). Hence,(
I
(M)
l1 , I
(M)
l2 , · · · , I(M)ln
)
d−→ (Il1, Il2, · · · , Iln), as M →∞, (5.12)
Y
(M)
l =
n∑
k=1
I
(M)
lk
d−→ Yl =
n∑
k=1
Iln, as M →∞. (5.13)
Theorem 5.2. Assume in a 1-1 arena with uniform fluctuations, the total number of players
is an even number M and their results I
(M)
lk = 1{The l-th player wins his k-th rounds} form
an M × n sample matrix
IM =


I
(M)
11 I
(M)
12 · · · I(M)1n
I
(M)
21 I
(M)
22 · · · I(M)2n
...
...
. . .
...
I
(M)
M1 I
(M)
M2 · · · I(M)Mn

 ,
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where n > 2. Then, the estimator
ˆρM =
√
3− tan2πTM
tan2πTM − 1 (5.14)
is a consistent estimator of the coefficient of fluctuations ρ, where
TM =
1
n− 1
(
1
Mn
M∑
l=1
(Y
(M)
l )
2 − 1
2
)
, Y
(M)
l =
n∑
k=1
I
(M)
lk , l = 1, 2, · · · ,M. (5.15)
Proof. See Appendix ??.
6 Tests and applications
In the first two parts, the arena model without fluctuations is evaluated on practical data
from FIFA World Cup and Hearthstone. In the third part, we conduct a simulation test for
the estimator in Theorem 5.2. Then we forge a connection between the arena model with
fluctuations and classic models on paired comparisons. Finally, a metric is introduced to
quantify the uncertainty in competitions.
6.1 Test with FIFA World Cup data
As we all know, knockouts are indispensable for the majority of sports, where our arena
model has a good performance. For instance, in every FIFA World Cup, the top two teams
of each group advance to the round of 16 and then compete on a knockout stage. The arena
model provides a direct way to make inferences for each team. We first stated that we are
by no means predicting the results of the next World Cup here, but demonstrating how to
apply the method to data produced from knockouts. The results of Brazil, Italy, Argentina
and Sweden over 80 years are listed below, where the number 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 means their
final results are respectively “fails to be top 16”, “9th∼16th”, “5th∼8th”, “3th or 4th”,
“runner-up” and “champion”. Next, we use the data in Table 1 to estimate each team’s
future results and the data in Table 2 to test our estimations.
Table 1: Data for train
Country 1930 1938 1954 1962 1970 1978 1986 1994 2002 2010
Brazil 3 3 2 5 5 3 2 5 5 2
Italy 0 5 1 1 4 3 1 4 1 0
Argentina 4 0 0 1 0 5 5 1 0 2
Sweden 0 3 0 0 1 1 0 3 1 0
Even though the FIFA World Cup involves many random factors and the strengths of
teams change occasionally, we view it as a 5-1 arena without fluctuations here to show some
rough prediction results. According to the Theorem 3.3, we can just assume p(x) = 1(0 6
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Table 2: Data for test
Country 1934 1950 1958 1966 1974 1982 1990 1998 2006 2014
Brazil 1 4 5 1 3 2 1 4 2 3
Italy 5 2 0 1 1 5 3 2 5 0
Argentina 1 0 1 2 2 1 4 2 2 4
Sweden 2 3 4 0 2 0 0 0 1 0
x 6 1) without loss of generality. Theorem 2.1, 2.2, 2.4 and 3.2 yield

p0 = 1/2
p1 = 1/4
p2 = 1/8
p3 = 1/16
p4 = 1/32
p5 = 1/32
and


p0(x) = 1− x
p1(x) = x(1− x2)
p2(x) = x
3(1− x4)
p3(x) = x
7(1− x8)
p4(x) = x
15(1− x16)
p5(x) = x
31,
(6.1)
where
pi =
{
P(Ai,1), 0 6 i 6 4,
P(A5,0), i = 5,
and pi(x) =
{
P(Ai,1|X = x), 0 6 i 6 4,
P(A5,0|X = x), i = 5,
(6.2)
Ai,j and X follow Theorem 2.4. Then we have
P
(
ξ = k|(N0, N1, · · · , N5)
)
=
∫ 1
0 pk(x)
5∏
i=0
[pi(x)]
Nidx
∫ 1
0
5∏
i=0
[pi(x)]Nidx
, (6.3)
where Ni and ξ represent the times that the result of a team is i in Table 1 and its future
result respectively. As a comparison, the sample mean estimator is also computed.
ξ
Brazil Italy Argentina Sweden
F P1 P2 F P1 P2 F P1 P2 F P1 P2
0 0 0.04 0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.09 0.4 0.4 0.33 0.5
1 0.3 0.08 0 0.2 0.17 0.4 0.3 0.15 0.2 0.2 0.35 0.3
2 0.2 0.13 0.3 0.2 0.24 0 0.4 0.23 0.1 0.2 0.23 0
3 0.2 0.20 0.3 0.1 0.26 0.1 0 0.26 0 0.1 0.07 0.2
4 0.2 0.24 0 0 0.17 0.2 0.2 0.19 0.1 0.1 0 0
5 0.1 0.31 0.4 0.3 0.06 0.1 0 0.08 0.2 0 0 0
Table 3: Results within different methods
In Table 3, the “F” refers to the frequency of different results of these four teams in
Table 2. The “P1” and “P2” are the results of our model and sample average with the data
in Table 1 respectively. Indeed, Assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A3) in our model do not hold
in this example. In fact, the prediction of results of FIFA World Cup is extremely complex,
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and we cannot solve it simply by the current arena model. Nevertheless, the arena model
without fluctuations enables us to quantify individuals’ strengths easily, which may bring
great convenience when applied in biology and machine learning.
6.2 Application in Hearthstone
Actually, our basic ideas are inspired by a game mode of Hearthstone—a hot game of
Blizzard—called “Arena”, whose rules are as follows (for more details, see [34]).
(1) After paying the entry fee, the player will build a deck in a specific way, which has some
uncertainty and is similar to (R1). (Of course, a deck differs from a random number.)
(2) Playing in Arena consists of a series of matches between Arena players, which usually
works like (R3).
(3) During each Arena run, a player can suffer up to three losses. Once a player has lost
three times or won 12 times, his run ends.
Since the way players build their decks is complicated, instead of applying arenas to this
mode, we study a similar mode called “Standard Brawliseum”. In this mode, players build
their decks by themselves, and our Assumption (A1) holds approximately (for more details,
see [35]). Some uncertainty does exist during each round of it, but we still regard “Standard
Brawliseum” as a 12-3 arena without fluctuations here to give a simple estimation using the
past match data.
Suppose a player have obtained 12-0, 10-3, 6-3, 12-2 in four runs with the same deck,
now we want to give an estimation of the probability that he obtains different results with
this deck in the future. By Theorem 2.1 and 3.3, we can express the posterior probability
that the player will end with (m, j) or (i, n) in a run in
(
m+ j − 1
m− 1
)
(
1
2
)m+j
∫ 1
0 pm,j(t)
∏
(k,l)∈Λ
[
pk,l(t)
]Nk,ldt∫ 1
0
∏
(k,l)∈Λ
[
pk,l(t)
]Nk,ldt (6.4)
and (
n+ i− 1
n− 1
)
(
1
2
)n+i
∫ 1
0 pi,n(t)
∏
(k,l)∈Λ
[
pk,l(t)
]Nk,ldt∫ 1
0
∏
(k,l)∈Λ
[
pk,l(t)
]Nk,ldt (6.5)
respectively, where j = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1, i = 0, 1, · · · ,m− 1, Nk,l refers to the times that the
player’s result is (k, l) in the past data. The Λ, pk,l(·) follow Definition 2.1 and Theorem
2.2 (choose p(x) = 1{0 6 x 6 1}). Since m = 12 is large, we use difference quotients
and trapezoid formula to compute the density function and integral respectively. Plugging
known quantity into (6.4) and (6.5) gives the table 4.
Table 4: Estimation of result
Result 12-0 12-1 12-2 11-3 10-3 9-3 8-3 7-3
Probability 3.0 ∗ 10−4 0.20 0.72 2.6 ∗ 10−2 5.5 ∗ 10−3 6.5 ∗ 10−4 4.2 ∗ 10−5 1.6 ∗ 10−6
Although we predict the results easily by applying the arena model without fluctuations,
it seems not to fit his past results well. Fluctuations do exist! So much further research
work is required to improve the arena model. For example, how to predict in an arena with
fluctuations of more general form, and how can we judge whether there are fluctuations in
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an arena. We do not answer this question in this paper and will solve these problems in the
future work.
6.3 Simulations
Here is a test for the estimation of ρ in Theorem 5.2. For ρ = 0.1, 0.5, 1, 2, 4 and 6, N = 1000
groups of random numbers are generated for M = 1024, n = 8 and M = 1024, n = 16 and
M = 8192, n = 8 respectively. The simulative results of the mean and MSE of the estimator
are listed below. In fact, the estimator is not valid for all samples, so we here set ρˆ = 0 if
TM >
1
3 and ρˆ = 10 if TM <
1
4 .
N = 1000
ρ
M=1024,n=8 M=1024,n=16 M=8192,n=8
E MSE E MSE E MSE
0.1 0.099 0.011 0.092 0.007 0.087 0.004
0.5 0.496 0.004 0.498 0.002 0.499 0.0004
1 0.997 0.003 1.001 0.002 0.999 0.0004
2 2.003 0.014 2.001 0.006 2.001 0.002
4 4.074 0.232 4.018 0.072 4.002 0.024
6 6.406 3.597 6.083 0.614 6.034 0.188
Table 5: Test of ρˆ
Evidently, our estimation of ρ performs well in both accuracy and stability when M and
n is relatively large. We can define the index of competition β = 11+ρ , which is a better
metric of the fluctuations of an arena in practice since it is a bijection from [0,+∞] to [0, 1]
and can reduce relative error. Furthermore, β has significance in sports that it will be close
to 1 if a game has little risk and relies almost on players’ capacity and 0 otherwise, as a
measurement of the stability and fairness of a game.
6.4 About paired comparison and Bradley-Terry model
In the Bradley-Terry model, the probability that object i is judged to have more of an
attribute than object j is
P(Xij = 1) =
eδi−δj
1 + eδi−δj
, (6.6)
where δi is the scale location of object i. In our model, if ρˆ is an estimator of ρ, we have
P(player ai beats player aj|Xi = xi,Xj = xj) = P(xi + ρ√
2
ǫi > xj +
ρ√
2
ǫj)
≈ P(xi + ρˆ√
2
ǫi > xj +
ρˆ√
2
ǫj)
= Φ
(
xi − xj
ρˆ
)
.
(6.7)
Here we regard i and j as two players and “player ai beats player aj” means “the agent
prefers i over j” and try to find a direct association between the scale location δi and the
strength xi. Tocher introduce an approximation of standard normal distribution in [32] that
Φ(x) ≈ e
2kx
e2kx + 1
, k =
√
2
π
. (6.8)
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We now apply this to derive an estimation of δi with ρˆ in our model. Let P(Xij = 1) =
P(player ai beats player aj |Xi = xi,Xj = xj) and we have
eδi−δj
1 + eδi−δj
≈ Φ
(
xi − xj
ρˆ
)
≈ e
2k(xi−xj)/ρˆ
1 + e2k(xi−xj)/ρˆ
, (6.9)
which implies
δi − δj ≈ 2k(xi − xj)
ρˆ
. (6.10)
Hence
2kxˆi
ρˆ
=
2k
√
1 + ρˆ2
ρˆ
Φ−1
(
Y
(M)
i
n
)
(6.11)
in arena model can be regarded as an estimation of δi in Bradley-Terry model. Further,
Glickman [12] gives a reparameterized version of the Bradley-Terry model by assuming the
prior distribution of a player’s strength is
θ|µ, σ2 ∼ N(µ, σ2) (6.12)
and the likelihood that i beats j in the k-th round is given by
P(sijk = 1|θi, θj) = 10
(θi−θj)/400
1 + 10(θi−θj)/400
. (6.13)
To establish connection between it and our model, we assume that θi is independent of θj
and σ2i = σ
2
j = σ
2 and the following proposition is required.
Proposition 6.1. Suppose ξ ∼ N(µ, σ2) and Φ(·) is the culmulative distribution function
of the standard normal distribution. Then
EΦ(ξ) = Φ
( µ√
1 + σ2
)
. (6.14)
Proof. Define
f(µ) = EΦ(ξ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
Φ(x)
1√
2πσ
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 dx. (6.15)
Since
g(µ, x) =
1√
2πσ
Φ(x)e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 > 0 (6.16)
is continuous differentiable on R2 and∫ +∞
−∞
g(µ, x)dx 6
∫ +∞
−∞
1√
2πσ
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 dx = 1 <∞, (6.17)
∫ +∞
−∞
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂µg(µ, x)
∣∣∣∣ dx 6 2√2πσ
∫ +∞
−∞
x− µ
σ2
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 dx =
2√
2πσ
<∞, (6.18)
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the integral
∫ +∞
−∞
∂
∂µg(µ, x)dx is uniformly convergent for µ ∈ R. Hence,
f ′(µ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
∂
∂µ
g(µ, x)dx
= − 1√
2πσ
∫ +∞
−∞
Φ(x)de−
(x−µ)2
2σ2
=
1
2πσ
∫ +∞
−∞
e−
(1+σ2)x2−2µx+µ2
2σ2 dx
=
1√
2π
√
1 + σ2
e
−
µ2
2(1+σ2) .
(6.19)
Also,
f(0) =
1√
2πσ
∫ +∞
−∞
Φ(x)e−
x2
2σ2 dx =
1
2
. (6.20)
By (6.15), (6.19) and (6.20), we have
f(µ) =
1
2
+
∫ µ
0
1√
2π
√
1 + σ2
e
−
x2
2(1+σ2)dx
= Φ
( µ√
1 + σ2
)
.
(6.21)
According to (6.7), (6.12) and (6.13), the above theorem gives
P(sijk = 1) = E
10(θi−θj)/400
1 + 10(θi−θj)/40
≈ EΦ(θi − θj
800k
ln10
)
= Φ
(
(µi − µj) ln10800k√
1 + 2σ2( ln10800k )
2
)
.
(6.22)
Let P(sijk = 1) = P(ai beats aj), we obtain an approximation that
(µi − µj) ln10800k√
1 + 2σ2( ln10800k )
2
≈ xi − xj
ρ
. (6.23)
If we already have an estimation of xi, xj and ρ, namely xˆi, xˆj and ρˆ, since |µi −µj | 6 3000
and P(|xi−xj| 6 154k ) > 0.99 (the 154k is chosen subjectively and is supposed to be determined
by actual data), we can estimate (µi, µj , σ
2) by


µˆi = 800kxˆi
µˆj = 800kxˆj
σˆ2 = 320000k2
(
ρˆ2 − 1
ln210
)
.
(6.24)
The inverse estimation using µˆi, µˆj, σˆ
2 is also available.
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6.5 A metric of chaos
For any given results in a 1-1 arena with uniform fluctuations, its coefficient of fluctuations
can be computed by (5.14), which represents the instability and volatility of a competition.
In a broad sense, for a matrix A ∈ BM×n which is made up of dummy variables and satisfies
1′MA =
M
2
1′n or 1
′
MA ≈
M
2
1′n, (6.25)
T (A) =
1
n− 1
(
1′nA
′A1n
Mn
− 1
2
)
or ρ(A) =
√
3− tan2πT (A)
tan2πT (A)− 1 or β(A) =
1
1 + ρ(A)
can be viewed as metrics of instability and randomness of a matrix A, based on the competi-
tion. We call any logical matrix satisfying (6.25) a win-loss matrix and β(A) the competition
index of A. As we stated before, for a win-loss matrix A, if β(A) is close to 0, there is irrel-
evance among rows of A in the sense of competition; if β(A) is close to 1, the competitive
relationship among its rows exists, which is valuable when analyzing dummy variables. For
instance, consider a matrix
An =


0 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 · · · 0 1
0 0 · · · 1 0
0 0 · · · 1 1
...
...
. . .
...
...
1 1 · · · 1 0
1 1 · · · 1 1


∈ B2n×n, (6.26)
whose rows are 0, 1, · · · ,M−1 = 2n−1 respectively, expressed in the binary numeral system
with digits n. By simple computation, we have
1′MAn = 2
n−11′n,
1′nA
′
nAn1n =
n∑
k=0
k2
(
n
k
)
= n
[
2n−1 + (n− 1)2n−2] , (6.27)
which means that An is a win-loss matrix and its competition index β(An) = 0; that is to
say there is no competitive relationship between An.
Here we only apply these measurements to a specific matrix. They can serve as metrics
of the degree of chaos when analyzing several groups of empirical binary data, which is likely
to represent some quantities significant but still unknown in biology and machine learning.
7 Conclusions
Firstly, we introduce arenas without fluctuations to describe competitions and give an in-
variant estimator. These work made up the framework of inferences about comparisons
without ratings. Secondly, we provide a simple estimator to detect to which extent the
outcomes of competitions are determined by “chance” as opposed to “skill”. It should be
stressed here that we concern about the cases that the number of players is large enough.
These conclusions are also based on this assumption.
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In this paper, we only study paired competitions that there is only one winner in each
round consisting of 2 players. Some further study can be done about the arena where p
individuals win out from q individuals. Besides, we only study the simplest case of arena
model with fluctuations. There is still much challenging generalization work to be done to
improve the arena model.
Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 5.2
Proof. Obviously, for arbitrary M ∈ 2N, Y (M)1 , · · · , Y (M)n are distributed identically, as
well as Y1, · · · , Yn. Suppose E(Y (M)1 )2 = µM and EY 21 = µ. Then for arbitrary ǫ > 0,
Chebyshev’s inequality gives
P
(∣∣∣∣∣(Y
(M)
1 )
2 + · · · + (Y (M)M )2
M
− µ
∣∣∣∣∣ 6 ǫ
)
6P
(∣∣∣∣∣(Y
(M)
1 )
2 + · · · + (Y (M)M )2
M
− µM
∣∣∣∣∣ 6 ǫ2
)
+ P(|µM − µ| 6 ǫ
2
)
6
4
M2ǫ2
V ar
[
(Y
(M)
1 )
2 + · · ·+ (Y (M)M )2
]
+ P(|µM − µ| 6 ǫ
2
)
=
4
M2ǫ2
{ M∑
l=1
V ar(Y
(M)
l )
2 + 2
∑
16i<j6M
Cov
[
(Y
(M)
i )
2, (Y
(M)
j )
2
]}
+ P(|µM − µ| 6 ǫ
2
).
(7.1)
For any fixed positive integers n > 2,
∀M ∈ 2N, V ar(Y (M)l )2 6 E(Y (M)l )4 6 n4. (7.2)
By Lemma 5.1 and Helly’s second theorem,
µM = EY
(M)
l → µ = EYl, as M →∞. (7.3)
It remains to show that the upper bound of Cov
[
(Y
(M)
i )
2, (Y
(M)
j )
2
]
can be controled by an
o(1) when M →∞. Due to the symmetry relation among
(I11, I12, · · · , I1n), (I21, I22, · · · , I2n), · · · , (IM1, IM2, · · · , IMn),
we can simplify Cov
[
(Y
(M)
1 )
2, (Y
(M)
2 )
2
]
by
E
(
I
(M)
11 + · · · + I(M)1n
)2 (
I
(M)
21 + · · ·+ I(M)2n
)2
−
[
E(Y
(M)
1 )
2
]2
=E
[
n(I
(M)
11 )
2 + n(n− 1)I(M)11 I(M)12
] (
I
(M)
21 + · · ·+ I(M)2n
)2
−
[
E(Y
(M)
1 )
2
]2
=nEI
(M)
11
(
I
(M)
21 + · · ·+ I(M)2n
)2
+ n(n− 1)EI(M)11 I(M)12
(
I
(M)
21 + · · ·+ I(M)2n
)2
−
[
E(Y
(M)
1 )
2
]2
.
(7.4)
For k=1,2,3,4, define
Bk = {a1 is the opponent of a2 in the k−th round},
B¯k = {a1 is not the opponent of a2 in the k−th round}.
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Then we have
Cov
[
(Y
(M)
1 )
2, (Y
(M)
2 )
2
]
+
[
E(Y
(M)
1 )
2
]2
=nP
(
I
(M)
11 = I
(M)
21 = 1
)
+ n(n− 1)P
(
I
(M)
11 = I
(M)
22 = 1
)
+ 4n(n− 1)P
(
I
(M)
11 = I
(M)
21 = I
(M)
22 = 1
)
+ 2n(n − 1)(n− 2)P
(
I
(M)
11 = I
(M)
22 = I
(M)
23 = 1
)
+ 2n(n− 1)P
(
I
(M)
11 = I
(M)
12 = I
(M)
21 = I
(M)
22 = 1
)
+ 4n(n − 1)(n− 2)P
(
I
(M)
11 = I
(M)
12 = I
(M)
21 = I
(M)
23 = 1
)
+ n(n− 1)(n − 2)(n − 3)P
(
I
(M)
11 = I
(M)
12 = I
(M)
23 = I
(M)
24 = 1
)
6nP(B¯1)P
(
I
(M)
11 = I
(M)
21 = 1
∣∣∣B¯1)+ n(n− 1) [P(B2) + P(B¯2)P(I(M)11 = I(M)22 = 1∣∣∣B¯2)]
+ 2n(n − 1)(n− 2)
[
P(B1) + P(B¯1)P
(
I
(M)
11 = I
(M)
22 = I
(M)
23 = 1
∣∣∣B¯1)]
+ 4n(n − 1)P(B¯1)P
(
I
(M)
11 = I
(M)
21 = I
(M)
22 = 1
∣∣∣B¯1)
+ 2n(n − 1)P(B¯1, B¯2)P
(
I
(M)
11 = I
(M)
12 = I
(M)
21 = I
(M)
22 = 1
∣∣∣B¯1, B¯2)
+ 4n(n − 1)(n− 2)
[
P(B3) + P(B¯1, B¯3)P
(
I
(M)
11 = I
(M)
12 = I
(M)
21 = I
(M)
23 = 1
∣∣∣B¯1, B¯3)]
+ n(n− 1)(n − 2)(n − 3)
[
P(B3) + P(B4) + P(B¯3, B¯4)P
(
I
(M)
11 = I
(M)
12 = I
(M)
23 = I
(M)
24 = 1
∣∣∣B¯3, B¯4)] .
(7.5)
Firstly by Assumption (A1’), (A3’) and Definition 3.2, we have
P(Bk) = 1
M − 1 = o(1), as M →∞, k = 1, 2, 3, 4. (7.6)
Secondly take P
(
I
(M)
11 = I
(M)
12 = I
(M)
23 = I
(M)
24 = 1
∣∣∣B¯3, B¯4) as an example and we know that
P
(
I
(M)
11 = I
(M)
12 = I
(M)
23 = I
(M)
24 = 1
∣∣∣B¯3, B¯4)
=P
(
I
(M)
11 = I
(M)
12 = I
(M)
23 = I
(M)
24 = 1
∣∣∣σ3(2) 6= 1, σ4(2) 6= 1)
=P
(
I
(M)
23 = I
(M)
24 = 1
∣∣∣I(M)11 = I(M)12 = 1, σ3(2) 6= 1, σ4(2) 6= 1)P(I(M)11 = I(M)12 = 1∣∣∣σ3(2) 6= 1, σ4(2) 6= 1)
=
(
1
2
− 1
π
arctan
√
1 + ρ2
3 + ρ2
)2
.
The last equation uses the fact that in the finite case, Xl is independent of Iik if i 6= l. As
a result,
P
(
I
(M)
11 = I
(M)
12 = I
(M)
23 = I
(M)
24 = 1
∣∣∣B¯3, B¯4) =
(
1
2
− 1
π
arctan
√
1 + ρ2
3 + ρ2
)2
+o(1), asM →∞.
(7.7)
By the same token, we have
P
(
I
(M)
11 = I
(M)
22 = I
(M)
23 = 1
∣∣∣B¯1)
=P
(
I
(M)
11 = I
(M)
21 = I
(M)
22 = 1
∣∣∣B¯1)
=
1
2
(
1
2
− 1
π
arctan
√
1 + ρ2
3 + ρ2
)
+ o(1), as M →∞,
(7.8)
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P(
I
(M)
11 = I
(M)
12 = I
(M)
21 = I
(M)
22 = 1
∣∣∣B¯1, B¯2)
=P
(
I
(M)
11 = I
(M)
12 = I
(M)
21 = I
(M)
23 = 1
∣∣∣B¯1, B¯3)
=
(
1
2
− 1
π
arctan
√
1 + ρ2
3 + ρ2
)2
+ o(1), as M →∞,
(7.9)
and
P
(
I
(M)
11 = I
(M)
21 = 1
∣∣∣B¯1) = P(I(M)11 = I(M)22 = 1∣∣∣B¯2) = 14 + o(1), as M →∞. (7.10)
Hence by (7.3), substituting (4.19),(7.6),(7.7),(7.8),(7.9),(7.10) into (7.5) yields
Cov
[
(Y
(M)
1 )
2, (Y
(M)
2 )
2
]
6
n2
4
+ n2(n− 1)
(
1
2
− 1
π
arctan
√
1 + ρ2
3 + ρ2
)
+ n2(n− 1)2
(
1
2
− 1
π
arctan
√
1 + ρ2
3 + ρ2
)2
−
(
n2
2
− n
2 − n
π
arctan
√
1 + ρ2
3 + ρ2
)2
+ o(1)
=o(1), as M →∞.
(7.11)
By (7.1) and (7.11), we have
lim
M→∞
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ (Y
(M)
1 )
2 + · · ·+ (Y (M)n )2
M
− µ
∣∣∣∣∣ 6 ǫ
)
= 0. (7.12)
Therefore,
(Y
(M)
1 )
2 + · · · + (Y (M)M )2
M
P−→ µ = n
2
2
− n
2 − n
π
arctan
√
1 + ρ2
3 + ρ2
, as M →∞, (7.13)
ˆρM =
√
3− tan2πTM
tan2πTM − 1
P−→ ρ, as M →∞. (7.14)
In conclusion, ˆρM is a consistent estimator of ρ.
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